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civil lawsuit—has usually been governed by subject matter jurisdiction,
claim and issue preclusion, and the joinder rules. These doctrines have
tended to favor aggregation for its efficiency, consistency, and predictability.
Yet aggregation is suddenly under attack from a new threat, one that has little
to do with aggregation directly: personal jurisdiction. In this Article, I
chronicle how a recent restrictive turn in personal jurisdiction—seen in
modern cases narrowing general jurisdiction and October Term 2016’s
blockbuster case Bristol-Myers Squibb—threatens the salutary benefits of
aggregation across a number of areas, including simple joinder of parties and
claims, representative actions, and multidistrict litigation. I offer a solution
for preserving aggregation’s advantages in the face of this trend in personal
jurisdiction: authorize a broader scope of personal jurisdiction in federal
court for multiparty and multiclaim cases. I defend such a regime as
constitutional and consistent with the norms of both personal jurisdiction and
aggregation.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. Wow Chemicals, which is
headquartered and incorporated in Russia, develops a new air-freshener
product designed for use in cars to give them “that new-car smell.” Wow
does not sell the product directly to consumers but instead sells to various
distributors around the world. Its American distributor is incorporated and
headquartered in Delaware. The distributor markets and sells the product to
retail stores in every state. Neither Wow nor the distributor puts any
warnings on the packaging or in the advertising for the product.
The air freshener is an immediate hit. The first year the product is
available, more than ten million Americans purchase and use it in their cars,
including many ridesharing and taxi drivers. Five years later, medical experts
conclude that an estimated one million people exposed to the air freshener
have developed a chronic and painful throat condition triggered by chemicals
in the product. Eventually, many affected individuals decide to file civil
lawsuits against Wow and its distributor for failure to adequately warn of the
air freshener’s dangers.
Nothing prevents each injured individual from suing the distributor in
a one-on-one lawsuit in either Delaware or the state where the injured
individual purchased or used the air freshener, or from suing Wow in a
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separate one-on-one lawsuit in Russia (to the extent Russian law would
permit the suit). 1 But such individualized litigation is highly problematic.
It would be costly and inconvenient for plaintiffs to travel to possibly
distant states (the place where they purchased or were exposed to the air
freshener may be across the country from where they now reside) or foreign
countries to sue in individual litigation. Plaintiffs forced to sue each
defendant separately would suffer the costs of duplicative litigation and
could face an “empty-chair defense,” in which Wow blames the distributor
to escape its fair apportionment of liability, while the distributor blames
Wow to escape its fair apportionment of liability, leaving plaintiffs short of
full, if any, compensation. 2
Individualized litigation presents risks to defendants as well.3 Each
defendant faces the prospect of being forced to litigate the same issues in
thousands of cases brought by separate plaintiffs, perhaps in different places
around the country. The first successful judgment against a defendant could
be used to establish liability against that defendant in future cases brought
by different plaintiffs through the doctrine of issue preclusion. 4 Separate
suits against Wow and its distributor could lead to a reverse-empty-chair
problem of excessive liability apportionment against both, effectively
overcompensating plaintiffs. Each plaintiff can seek punitive damages to
deter the same conduct, effectively overpunishing both defendants. If
plaintiffs seek injunctive relief directing the addition of warning labels on
the packaging, courts may issue injunctions that create inconsistent
obligations on each defendant.
The crush of individualized litigation burdens the system, too. Each
individual case will present the same crucial issue—whether the defendants
failed to provide adequate warnings—risking repetitious discovery and

1 Injured individuals might be able to sue Wow in the state where the injury occurred, but that
possibility is uncertain in light of the fairness factors articulated in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), and in light of the direct connection between the defendant and the forum
required by more recent specific jurisdiction cases. See infra Section II.C. Elsewhere, I have argued that
alien defendants ought to be subject to a much broader scope of personal jurisdiction. See William S.
Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2018) (arguing
for a national contacts approach to personal jurisdiction over alien defendants).
2 See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 217 (1994) (“[A] defendant will often argue the
‘empty chair’ in the hope of convincing the jury that the [absent defendant] was exclusively responsible
for the damage.”). See generally 3 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29:34 (2017) (discussing the defense).
3 It also presents the advantage of reducing the number of meritorious individual cases filed because
of cost pressures on and inconveniences to those plaintiffs, but this is not an advantage that the civil
justice system deems to be a virtue. See infra text accompanying notes 73–74.
4 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–33 (1979).
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pretrial motions, as well as exponential increases in litigation costs and
attorney’s fees. 5
In contrast to the burdens, inefficiencies, and potential unfairness of
individualized litigation, aggregation makes sense from all perspectives.
Aggregation permits the common issues to be litigated once, with all
interests presented and determined in a single adjudication. Both plaintiffs
and defendants can pool their resources and share information to make their
litigation efforts more efficient and effective. The lawsuits can be heard in a
single court before a single judge and jury, saving the judicial system, the
witnesses, and the parties millions of dollars and a great deal of time. A
federal court would likely have jurisdiction to hear all related claims, even if
some were for smaller values than others,6 and the joinder rules would extend
to all claims that depend upon a common issue, such as the defendants’
alleged failure to provide adequate warnings. 7 The plaintiffs could also
potentially join together in a class action or in multidistrict litigation (MDL),
perhaps even uniting all affected users nationwide in a single lawsuit or
consolidated action. 8
Modern federal law generally encourages such aggregation, precisely
for the efficiency and fairness that it provides, 9 and plaintiffs, defendants,
and courts have used aggregation to reap these advantages.10 Today,
however, such benefits are all but impossible in a case like the air-freshener
case above. That is not (primarily) because the law of aggregation has
changed. Rather, it is because the law of personal jurisdiction has changed.
Personal jurisdiction—the adjudicatory authority of a court over a
party—has historically had little to do with aggregation directly. But recent
decisions from the Supreme Court cabining the reach of courts’ personal
jurisdiction over defendants—including October Term 2016’s bombshell
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court 11—have imbued the doctrine
5 Issue preclusion could mitigate some of these costs, but the doctrine is flexible and pockmarked by
exceptions. See id. at 329–31 (cautioning against overuse of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion if the
plaintiff could have easily joined the earlier action or preclusion might be unfair to the defendant).
6 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005) (holding that
supplemental jurisdiction permits joinder of plaintiffs who have jurisdictionally insufficient claims if
joined with a plaintiff who has a jurisdictionally sufficient claim).
7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (MDL); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions).
9 For a recent history of aggregation, see Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative
Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2017).
10 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure of
the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 263–66 (2006) (detailing the successes of aggregation
for resolving asbestos claims in the early 1990s).
11 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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with a powerful disaggregation effect by requiring a close connection
between the forum state, each defendant, and each claim.
This restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction means that similarly
situated plaintiffs injured in different states are unlikely to be able to sue codefendants from different states, like Wow and its distributor, in the same
lawsuit. Even as against one of the defendants, plaintiffs residing in the same
state might not be able to join together in the same lawsuit if they were
injured in different states. 12 The resulting disaggregation causes waste and
unfairness to the parties and the system.
In this Article, I tell the intersecting stories of personal jurisdiction and
aggregation. Part I opens with aggregation, and goes on to show that the
modern incarnation of federal civil litigation seeks to reap the advantages of
aggregation by favoring joinder, representative litigation, and consolidation.
In some instances, the law even forces joinder over the preferences of the
parties because the efficiencies and sensibilities of aggregation are so strong.
This Part ties together ordinary party and claim joinder, class actions,
collective actions, preclusion, and multidistrict litigation. The law’s
favoritism toward aggregation is not unfettered, as illustrated in recent class
action cases, but limitations tend to be imposed as part of aggregation’s own
terms.
Part II switches to the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Until recently,
personal jurisdiction was largely solicitous of aggregation, and direct
conflicts tended to be resolved in favor of modifying personal jurisdiction to
accommodate aggregation. But 2011 marked a dramatic turn toward more
restrictive personal jurisdiction. 13 This restrictive turn has not escaped
commentators’ notice, but, to date, commentators naturally have focused on
the implications for personal jurisdiction doctrine directly; 14 few have
interrogated the consequences of personal jurisdiction’s restrictive trend for
aggregation. 15 Here, I demonstrate that this trend poses severe threats to the
salutary benefits of aggregation.

12 Plaintiffs could join together in the defendant’s home state, but for foreign defendants like Wow,
the relevant foreign home country might not permit aggregation. Russia, for example, does not allow
class actions. See Deborah R. Hensler, From Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are
Spreading Globally, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 965, 967 (2017).
13 See infra Section II.B.
14 See, e.g., John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 607, 611 (2015); Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler
and Its Implications for Personal Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 675–
77 (2015).
15 One exception is Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms:
Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251 (2018),
which focuses narrowly on the effects of Bristol-Myers Squibb on mass-tort litigation, with a particular
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Part III turns to some solutions for restoring the balance. In federal
court, the most promising solution is to broaden Rule 4(k) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which currently pegs personal jurisdiction in most
federal court cases to the same scope that would apply in state court. 16 Rule
4(k)’s state-based limitation is the source of the disaggregation problems, but
the Constitution does not require such a limitation in federal court. Thus,
regaining the benefits and purposes of aggregation in a world of restrictive
personal jurisdiction is simply a matter of expanding—by statute or rule
amendment—personal jurisdiction in multiparty or multiclaim cases. In this
Part, I explore that possibility, its virtues, and its potential vices.
I.

LAW’S PREFERENCE FOR AGGREGATION

For many years, the civil system favored individual, one-on-one
litigation that limited the range of issues to keep trial a simple affair.17 But
as travel became easier, as commerce expanded, as pretrial expenses
ballooned relative to trial expenses, and as litigation became more complex,
the simplification of litigation became unfair and unworkable. 18 The
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 resulted in a
culmination of equity-driven preferences, including for aggregation, 19 which
became entrenched in law and practice in subsequent decades.20 This Part
explores the mechanisms in place to facilitate and encourage aggregation,
and then identifies aggregation’s limitations.
A. Aggregation’s Advantages and Mechanics
Nearly everyone benefits in some form from aggregation. Courts and
parties benefit from increased efficiency, the avoidance of duplicative

emphasis on federal multidistrict litigation. See id. at 1256–57. In this Article, I take a much more
expansive view of the intersection between personal jurisdiction and aggregation.
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
17 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 915–
16 (1987) (“The obligation to choose only one writ at a time limited the scope of law suits, as did rules
severely restricting the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants.”); id. at 916 (“Common law also evolved as
a technical pleading system designed to resolve a single issue.”).
18 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 629 (1988) (detailing complaints about the constraints of pre-Rules
joinder); Edson R. Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571, 581 (1920) (same).
19 See generally William Wirt Blume, Free Joinder of Parties, Claims, and Counterclaims, 2 F.R.D.
250 (1943) (contrasting pre-Rules joinder with Rules joinder); see also Subrin, supra note 17, at 912
(“[T]he evolution of the Federal Rules reveals that rules of equity prevailed over common law
procedure.”).
20 See generally Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991)
(documenting the rise of aggregation from the 1960s to the 1990s); Resnik, supra note 9 (offering a recent
history of aggregation).
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litigation, and consistency in judgments and precedent. 21 As a result, the law
favors aggregation of claims, plaintiffs, defendants, and even cases.
1. Joining Claims
Claim joinder is liberal. Rule 18 allows a claimant to join as many
claims as she has against a single opponent.22 The theory behind Rule 18 is
that once the parties are already before the court in an adversarial posture,
there is no inconvenience in allowing the claimant to lodge all of her
grievances at once. As the Advisory Committee Notes explain,
The Rules proceed upon the theory that no inconvenience can result from the
joinder of any two or more matters in the pleadings, but only from trying two
or more matters together which have little or nothing in common. Accordingly,
Rule 18(a) has permitted a party to plead multiple claims of all types against an
opposing party, subject to the court’s power to direct an appropriate procedure
for trying the claims. 23

The same permissiveness extends, in Rule 13, to all counterclaims that
the defendant has against the plaintiff. 24 The result is that these rules allow
the joinder of all claims between the original adverse parties. 25 Coparties may
also assert claims against each other if they “arise[] out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action.” 26
Jurisdictional principles facilitate this liberal claim joinder. If the joined
claim satisfies diversity or federal question jurisdiction, the federal court can
hear it. 27 For diversity jurisdiction, the amounts in controversy of claims
joined under Rule 18(a) can be aggregated, allowing claims that would not
separately meet the jurisdictional amount to be heard together. 28 In addition,
a federal court can hear a claim under Rule 18 or Rule 13 that is not eligible

21 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 20, at 21; see also D. Theodore Rave,
Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192–93 (2013).
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (“A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim
may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.”).
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), 13(b).
25 Other rules allow joinder of new parties. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 14, 19, 20, 24. Subsequent
subparts address those joinder rules. See infra text accompanying notes 33–64.
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
27 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2012).
28 See, e.g., Pearson v. Nat’l Soc’y of Pub. Accountants, 200 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 1953); James
E. Pfander, The Simmering Debate over Supplemental Jurisdiction, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1212
(“[T]he plaintiff may freely aggregate all of the claims he or she has against the defendant. This rule of
permissive aggregation applies, even where the claims bear no transactional . . . relationship to one
another.”).
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for diversity or federal question jurisdiction if the joined claim is related to
a claim over which the federal court has original jurisdiction.29
Joining related claims promotes efficiency and inhibits inconsistencies
to such a degree that the law compels assertion of certain related claims. Rule
13(a) compels counterclaims “aris[ing] out of the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” 30
Similarly, the federal common law of claim preclusion (also known as res
judicata) prevents parties from litigating claims not raised in a previous suit
that could have been raised because of their close relation to previously
litigated claims between the parties. 31 Rule 13(a) and claim preclusion thus
facilitate the benefits of claim aggregation by discouraging the waste of
separate litigation and promoting the consistency of judgments. 32
2. Joining Plaintiffs
Aggregating plaintiffs offers them the opportunity to reduce costs in a
way that can make meritorious but otherwise economically nonviable
litigation viable, 33 offers defendants the opportunity for mass resolution and
potentially global peace in one fell swoop, 34 and furthers private enforcement
of compliance with substantive law. 35 Plaintiffs may join together in one case
through the rules of ordinary joinder or through procedural mechanisms
providing for representative litigation, such as a class action.
Rule 20 permits plaintiffs to join in one action if they assert related
claims and if “any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise
29

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012) (granting supplemental jurisdiction for certain joined claims).
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A).
31 See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (“A final judgment on the
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have
been raised in that action.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 24, 26 (AM. LAW. INST. 1982)
(limiting claim preclusion to related claims). Federal common law establishes the claim-preclusive effect
of a federal judgment, but if the first claim was a state claim, then federal preclusion law follows state
preclusion law. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001).
32 See Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1214–15
(1986) (“[P]reclusion doctrines promote conservation of severely-taxed federal judicial resources. . . .
[G]rowing aversion to relitigation is a leading reason for the expansion of prelusion doctrines.”).
33 Even substantial tort claims can be economically nonviable after the expenses of litigation, experts,
and attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1943, 1952 (2017) (citing high litigation costs for such plaintiffs).
34 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 414
(2014) (“Centralization [in MDL] likewise advantages defendants by making meaningful closure possible
through a global settlement.”); Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Common Questions in MDL Proceedings,
66 U. KAN. L. REV. 219, 219 (2017) (“From the defendants’ perspective, consolidation in a federal MDL
proceeding may make nationwide litigation more manageable.”).
35 See Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation 2 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and
Econ.,
Research
Paper
No. 17-45,
2018),
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3059583
[https://perma.cc/9JKR-F9H6].
30
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in the action.” 36 Plaintiffs may also intervene in a lawsuit, with permission
of the court, if they “ha[ve] a claim or defense that shares with the main
action a common question of law or fact.” 37 As with claim joinder, the rules
governing supplemental jurisdiction permit federal courts to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over all claims brought by plaintiffs joined under Rules
20 and 24 in a federal question case. 38 Even in diversity cases, supplemental
jurisdiction extends to state claims brought by plaintiffs joined under Rule
20 that would fail to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement
independently. 39
In circumstances in which the case will impair nonparties’ interests
without their participation, joinder may be required under Rule 19 or allowed
without resort to court discretion under Rule 24.40 As the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 19 state, “Whenever feasible, the persons
materially interested in the subject of an[y] action . . . should be joined as
parties so that they may be heard and a complete disposition made.” 41
Because the mandatory nature of these joinder rules raises the possibility that
parties will attempt to evade the limits of diversity jurisdiction by structuring
the case to require joinder of a diversity-destroying party, supplemental
jurisdiction over the claims of joined parties in diversity cases is more
limited. 42
At times, harmful conduct affects more plaintiffs than can reasonably
be joined under the rules of ordinary joinder, but whose joinder would
improve fairness and efficiency. In 1938, the same year as the original
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated, Congress passed the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which enabled employees to bring actions
for owed wages for themselves and on “behalf” of “other employees
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). I use the term “related” for convenience; the actual language is “any right
to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Id. 20(a)(1)(A).
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012) (extending supplemental jurisdiction to related claims).
39 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005).
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1) (requiring joinder if feasible if “in that person’s absence, the court cannot
accord complete relief among existing parties,” or if that person’s absence may “impair or impede the
person’s ability to protect [an] interest [relating to the action]” or “leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the
interest”); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (granting intervention as a right to anyone who “claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest”).
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (excluding certain claims by plaintiffs joined under Rules 19 and 24). For
more on the intersection of joinder and diversity jurisdiction, see Scott Dodson & Philip A. Pucillo, Joint
and Several Jurisdiction, 65 DUKE L.J. 1323 (2016).
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similarly situated,” 43 a standard that is not difficult to meet in most FLSA
cases involving a common employer. 44 The reason for allowing joinder in
these so-called “collective actions” was summed up by one attorney working
for the agency in charge of implementing the FLSA: “To require each
employee to sue individually might well congest court calendars
immeasurably and produce long delays in the gaining of rightful
recoveries.” 45 Judges have long taken the salutary benefits of collective
actions to heart, 46 and statutes in several other contexts provide for the same
collective-action framework. 47
Collective actions’ more famous sibling is, of course, the class action.
Although class actions have a venerable history, 48 the modern rule was
adopted in 1966, after the Supreme Court relaxed due process strictures on
representative litigation. 49 Rule 23 imposes requirements designed to ensure
efficiency gains in the action and fairness to the absent class members, 50 and
showing entitlement to certification of a class can be difficult. 51 But class
actions remain the vehicle of choice for large-scale litigation of securities,
antitrust, consumer, and many discrimination and mass-tort claims. 52 Though

43

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012)). Today, the Act requires all represented plaintiffs to file a consent
with the court. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless
he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.”).
44 See Matthew W. Lampe & E. Michael Rossman, Procedural Approaches for Countering the DualFiled FLSA Collective Action and State-Law Wage Class Action, 20 LAB. LAW. 311, 314 (2005).
45 James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
37 ILL. L. REV. 119, 123 (1942).
46 See Resnik, supra note 9, at 1786–87 (explaining how judges “f[ou]nd ways to welcome additional
litigants into FLSA proceedings”).
47 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012).
48 See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1987) (tracing the history of class actions through 1966); Scott Dodson, A Negative
Retrospective of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917 (2017) (offering a history of failed Rule 23 amendment
proposals); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013) (recounting the history of the modern class actions through 1980);
John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323
(2005) (documenting the Rule 23 amendment history through the 2000s).
49 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950) (relaxing notice
requirements). For a discussion of Mullane’s relevance to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, see Resnik,
supra note 9, at 1779–80.
50 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
51 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–54 (2011) (requiring a “rigorous analysis”
and “significant proof” that the class meets the certification requirements).
52 See Resnik, supra note 9, at 1767, 1803.
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highly controversial, 53 there is no doubt that class actions provide
unparalleled “economies of scale for defendants and for judges by limiting
repetitive work and inconsistent decisionmaking and by holding out
promises of a ‘comprehensive resolution’ if not ‘global peace.’” 54
3. Joining Defendants
Aggregating defendants allows defendants to pool resources and share
information to mount a joint defense, 55 protects plaintiffs from the “emptychair defense” of each solo defendant pointing the finger at an unjoined
defendant, 56 and furthers justice by allowing a full airing in a single case of
all perspectives of a dispute. Modern litigation often implicates more than
one defendant who is potentially liable for the harm caused; accordingly,
joinder rules and special statutory regimes encourage defense-side joinder.
Rules 19, 20, and 24 permit or require joinder of defendants on the same
liberal terms as for joinder of plaintiffs, 57 and Rule 23 even permits (and
sometimes requires) defendant classes. 58 In addition, Rule 14 permits a
defendant to implead a third party, who is usually aligned on the side of the
defendant, and allows other claims between that third party and an existing
party. 59
Supplemental jurisdiction generally extends to all claims allowed by
these joinder rules, except in diversity cases, to claims by plaintiffs against
parties joined under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24. 60 To encourage a plaintiff to join
defendants who may be liable to it, the federal common law of issue

53 See Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171, 172 (2016)
(surveying criticisms that class actions promote blackmail settlements against defendants and sweetheart
deals for class counsel).
54 Resnik, supra note 9, at 1779 (quoting Baker, supra note 33, at 1944); see also Assaf Hamdani &
Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 696–99 (2005) (discussing class actions’
defense-side benefits); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 563–64, 570–72 (1987) (identifying the benefits of mass-tort class
actions).
55 See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and
the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 813 (1989); Mary Kay Kane,
Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723, 1728–29 (1998).
The most comprehensive scholarly treatment of defendant aggregation concludes that although
defendants sometimes oppose defendant aggregation for misguided reasons founded on cognitive bias,
defendants generally benefit from such aggregation. See generally Greg Reilly, Aggregating Defendants,
41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1011 (2014).
56 See supra note 2.
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a), 20(a)(2), 24.
58 Id. 23.
59 Id. 14(a).
60 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2012).
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preclusion can bar a plaintiff who loses against one defendant from
relitigating the loss in successive lawsuits against similar defendants. 61
One species of defendant joinder is actually a claimant-joinder regime:
interpleader. The classic interpleader case involves an insurance company
that concedes its contractual duty to pay an insurance benefit to which
multiple persons claim entitlement. In such a case, the insurance company
may face distinct lawsuits from several claimants for recovery of the same
benefit, potentially resulting in the insurer being obligated to pay the full
amount of a policy benefit multiple times. 62
The Federal Interpleader Act remedies this situation by allowing the
insurance company (or other stakeholder) to deposit the property held or
owed with the court and institute an interpleader action naming the claimants
as defendants. 63 All claimants then adjudicate their respective claims to the
property in a single action, thereby protecting the stakeholder from multiple
judgments with which it cannot comply, guarding against duplicative
proceedings, and enabling full and fair adjudication of the competing rights
of the claimants. 64
4. Joining Cases
Whole cases can be joined together in a single proceeding under certain
circumstances presenting fruitful efficiency gains and economies of scale.
Rule 42, for example, authorizes a court to join for a hearing or trial, or
formally consolidate any “actions before the court [that] involve a common
question of law or fact.” 65 The purpose of this rule “is to give the district
court broad discretion to decide how cases on its docket are to be tried so
that the business of the court may be dispatched with expedition and
economy while providing justice to the parties.” 66 The liberality of Rule 42
consolidation has allowed courts to join cases often and fruitfully over the
years, particularly as complex litigation has become more commonplace.67

61

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
63 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012). For a history, see 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 1701 (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER 3d ed.].
64 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134, 1134–35
(1932). Bankruptcy presents a similar remedy in the context of a specialized form of substantive law. See
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1950 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(describing the virtues of bankruptcy joinder).
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
66 9A WRIGHT & MILLER 3d ed., supra note 63, § 2381.
67 Id. (“These procedures have proven extremely useful over the years; this has been particularly true
ever since the tremendous growth in multiparty and multiclaim litigation in the federal courts.”).
62
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Consolidation under Rule 42 only applies to cases already pending in
the same district court. 68 Cases pending in different district courts, however,
can be transferred to the same federal judge for mass consolidation of pretrial
issues under the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968. 69 The Act creates a
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) and grants the panel “broad
discretion to consolidate cases sharing any common question of fact and to
transfer them to a single federal district judge for coordinated pretrial
proceedings.” 70 Although the JPML was initially slow to order consolidation
under the Act, multidistrict litigation became an accepted mechanism for
mass torts by the 1990s and, today, is the prevailing mechanism for
aggregating mass torts. 71 By some estimates, more than one-third of the
current federal docket consists of MDL cases, 72 offering (usually) swift,
efficient, and uniform resolution to what would otherwise be thousands of
individual lawsuits.
B. Aggregation’s Limits
Aggregation is not an unalloyed good. Some parties strategically
oppose aggregation if their opponents are likely to reap a disproportionate
share of its benefits. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, for example, the defendant
opposed aggregation of plaintiffs because it suspected that “a lot of those
cases aren’t going to get filed” as stand-alone cases because the cost
pressures on many plaintiffs to litigate individually would be too great. 73 But
the law rightly denies that such a reason is a legitimate basis to oppose
aggregation; to the contrary, a primary goal of aggregation is to enable
litigation that might be too inefficient or uneconomical to pursue
individually. 74
Other drawbacks to aggregation are more defensible. Like individual
litigation, aggregation can sometimes generate confusion, delay, and
unfairness. For the most part, however, these risks are addressed within the

68

FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (addressing actions before “the court”).
28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
70 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1262.
71 See id. at 1261; Resnik, supra note 9, at 1801–02; see also, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig.
(No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416, 419 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (consolidating more than 26,000 asbestos cases
because of the “long delays,” “transaction costs,” and duplicative issues “litigated over and over”).
72 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1252; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat
Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1448 (2017).
73 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1254 (purporting to quote Oral Argument at 23:00, Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Ct. App. 2014)).
74 See Resnik, supra note 9, at 1801 (“Class action revisions aimed to enable litigation . . . . Class
actions enabled sets of new plaintiffs—schoolchildren, prisoners, consumers, and employees—to make
their way into the federal courts.”).
69
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rules of aggregation themselves. For example, the joinder rules provide for
aggregation only when appropriate based on the litigation of common
issues. 75 When joinder, representation, or consolidation could lead to
confusion or prejudice, judges have broad discretion to disaggregate issues
or claims for separate adjudication. 76
Recent years have revealed increasing skepticism of plaintiff class
actions as aggregation mechanisms. 77 There is at least some basis for this
skepticism: aggregated proceedings can result in the dispensation of rough
justice in the name of efficiency, and some of this rough justice turns out, on
closer inspection, to be unjust. 78
Solutions have focused on aggregation’s own terms. For example, the
Supreme Court has demanded “significant proof” of Rule 23’s
requirements, 79 even stressing that “heightened attention” to certain Rule 23
requirements are necessary in settlement classes; 80 it has imposed stricter
interpretations of Rule 23(a) requirements; 81 and it has restricted the scope
of the categories of Rule 23(b) classes. 82 At the same time, lower courts have
interpreted Rule 23 to require the putative class to show, as a prerequisite to
certification, that its members are “ascertainab[le]” through some objective

75

See supra Section I.A.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or
drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”); see also id. 20(b) (“The court may
issue orders—including an order for separate trials—to protect a party against embarrassment, delay,
expense, or other prejudice that arises from including a person against whom the party asserts no claim
and who asserts no claim against the party.”); id. 23(c)(5) (authorizing a judge to divide a class action
into subclasses); id. 23(d)(1)(A) (authorizing a judge presiding over a class action to “determine the
course of proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in presenting
evidence or argument”); id. 42(b) (“For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize,
the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or
third-party claims.”).
77 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731 (2013).
78 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–20, 629 (1997) (rejecting a class
settlement in part because of concerns of fairness to absent class members). Some commentators have
begun to criticize MDL aggregation on similar grounds. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging
Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 75–77 (2015).
79 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353 (2011); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
80 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–21 (identifying “predominance” in Rule 23(b)(3) and adequacy in Rule
23(a)(4) as deserving of scrutiny).
81 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (interpreting commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) to require common
questions “capable of classwide resolution”); Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 (rejecting an across-the-board
theory of typicality under Rule 23(a)(3)).
82 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 362 (limiting Rule 23(b)(2) to exclude most claims for monetary relief); Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 843–45 (1999) (construing narrowly the scope of a “limited fund”
eligible for certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
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criteria. 83 Congress, too, has often sought to constrain class actions. 84
Importantly, with few exceptions, these curtailments of broad class
aggregation are based on aggregation itself. The solution has been to tinker
with the rules of aggregation to secure the very virtues of efficiency and
fairness that aggregation promises. 85
Controlling the scope of aggregation on its own terms makes sense. But
recent decisions from the Supreme Court have drastically curtailed
aggregation by addressing an issue having little to do doctrinally with
aggregation: personal jurisdiction.
II. THE TURNING OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In this Part, I introduce personal jurisdiction into the aggregation
narrative and show how personal jurisdiction has changed from being
relatively expansive and solicitous of aggregation to being more constrictive
and indirectly hostile to aggregation.
A. The Expansion of Personal Jurisdiction
For many years, personal jurisdiction depended upon the notion of
territorial sovereignty. A court could obtain jurisdiction over a party and
adjudicate that party’s rights and liabilities only if the party was within that
state’s borders. As the famous case Pennoyer v. Neff put it: “[N]o State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory.” 86 That model worked for an era in which state autonomy was
jealously guarded, parties were primarily individual persons, and personal
mobility was low; in such circumstances, it was unfair to both the person and
the person’s state for a different state to claim authority over the person, at
least without the person’s consent. And, because litigation was generally
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See Dodson, supra note 48, at 925–27 (describing the lower courts’ interpretation).
For example, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, which passed the House on March 9,
2017, would limit class certification in a number of ways. See Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of
2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr985/BILLS-115hr985rh.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PX5-ZLGR].
85 Potential exceptions include the use of contractual arbitration to induce an enforceable waiver of
class-action rights, see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 334 (2011), amendments
making certain class actions less remunerative to class counsel, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012) (limiting
the fees payable to lawyers representing prisoners), and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which
sought to limit the power of state-court class actions by enabling them to be heard more often by federal
courts, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441 (2012).
86 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878); see id. at 720 (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted
by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”). For an incisive look at Pennoyer’s
foundations, see Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017).
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simpler, often involving only a single plaintiff and a single defendant, the
effect on aggregation was minimal. 87
The diminishment of state power, the rise of artificial entities, and the
erosion of barriers to interstate travel led to reconsideration of the strict
territorial approach of Pennoyer in the landmark case of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington. 88 There, the Court allowed a state to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonconsenting nonresident if the nonresident had
“minimum contacts” with the state such that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” 89 Central to that determination was whether the nonresident’s
contacts with the forum made it “reasonable” for the state to exercise
personal jurisdiction in light of the “inconveniences which would result . . .
from a trial away from [the nonresident’s] home.” 90 In particular, the Court
stated that when a nonresident “exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state” and thereby “enjoys the benefits and protection of
the laws of that state,” the state may assert jurisdiction over the nonresident
on claims “connected with the activities within the state.” 91
Over the next several decades, the Court glossed these standards with
various considerations, leading to seemingly settled features of personal
jurisdiction by the late-1980s. For example, the Court distanced personal
jurisdiction’s connection to both interstate federalism and state sovereignty,
and instead linked personal jurisdiction primarily (even solely) to individual
rights. 92 The Court also required, for minimum contacts, some “purposeful
availment” of the forum by the defendant, such that the connection to the
forum could not arise solely from the activities of unrelated third parties. 93
The Court further established that a plaintiff’s lack of contacts with the forum
87 See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Became (Disguised)
Summary Judgment, 25 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 98 (2007) (“The current provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were designed in an earlier era for litigation that on average has been far simpler
than litigation today.”).
88 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
89 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
90 Id. at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91 Id. at 319.
92 See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The
personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”); id. at
702–03 n.10 (“The restriction on sovereign power described in [prior cases] . . . must be seen as ultimately
a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns.”).
93 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 479–80 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 295–96 (1980).
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state was irrelevant to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, 94 but that the strength of the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum
could support such exercise. 95 Finally, the Court expanded upon the notion
of “fair play and substantial justice” by articulating several relevant factors,
including “the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and
the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief,” as well as systemic interests in
efficient dispute resolution and in the furtherance of social policies. 96 The
Court additionally noted that these forum and systemic interests could
enhance support for personal jurisdiction. 97
A major development during this time was the division of personal
jurisdiction into two distinct species: specific jurisdiction and general
jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction could be asserted when the defendant’s
conduct or activities in the state gave rise or were related to the cause of
action. General jurisdiction could be asserted over a defendant with a strong
connection to the state, even if the cause of action arose elsewhere and was
unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state. 98 Language from the
Court’s cases on general jurisdiction led most observers to conclude (and
“[teach] to generations of first-year law students” 99) that general jurisdiction
applied to any defendant with “continuous and systematic” contacts with the
forum state, meaning any kind of substantial business dealings. 100
As personal jurisdiction was stretching from its more rigid moorings,
federal civil litigation was becoming more complex. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure—built on a tradition of equity—liberalized joinder of
94

See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779–80 (1984).
Id. at 780 (“[P]laintiff’s residence in the forum may, because of defendant’s relationship with the
plaintiff, enhance defendant’s contacts with the forum.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (“The
plaintiff’s lack of ‘contacts’ will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so manifold as
to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence.” (citation omitted)).
96 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
97 See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777 (“New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with
other States . . . to provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and damage claims arising out of a
libel in a unitary proceeding. This rule reduces the potential serious drain of libel cases on judicial
resources. It also serves to protect defendants from harassment resulting from multiple suits.”).
98 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–17; cf. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)
(acknowledging that personal jurisdiction can attach when “continuous corporate operations within a state
[are] thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities”). See generally Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look
at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988) (fleshing out the contours of general jurisdiction).
99 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
100 See Brilmayer, supra note 98, at 767 (“Courts currently measure the sufficiency of unrelated
business contacts between the forum state and the defendant with the continuous and systematic test.”);
Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 671, 675 (2012) (stating that “lower courts widely embraced the notion that any corporation ‘doing
business’ in a state was subject to general jurisdiction there”); Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially
at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 533 (2012).
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claims, parties, and cases. 101 Over the next several years, Congress provided
for collective actions, Rule 23 was amended to liberalize class actions, and
the Multidistrict Litigation Act was passed. 102 The 1970s and 1980s
witnessed a dramatic turn toward, and acceptance of, complex civil
litigation. 103
The expansion of personal jurisdiction during this time tended to work
in tandem with the expansion of complex litigation by facilitating joinder. In
a multi-plaintiff case, for example, plaintiffs could join together under
ordinary joinder or in representative litigation to sue in any forum in which
the defendant had continuous and systematic contacts, even if their claims
arose in different states. Walmart, for example, though incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered in Arkansas, could be sued in any state for any
cause of action, 104 making joinder of plaintiffs from different states
unobjectionable on personal jurisdiction grounds.
Although the Court made clear that personal jurisdiction in a multidefendant case is a defendant-by-defendant inquiry, 105 the combination of
broad general jurisdiction, fairness-based specific jurisdiction, and
enhancement from the plaintiff’s forum contacts often produced multiple
forums with personal jurisdiction over all defendants in a single case, thus
facilitating joinder of defendants. For example, in Calder v. Jones, Shirley
Jones, a television personality who lived and worked in California, sued the
National Enquirer, its local distributor, its president, and a reporter in
California state court for libel arising out of a story the magazine published
about her. 106 The magazine and its distributor did not object to personal
jurisdiction in California, no doubt because they believed themselves subject
to either specific or general jurisdiction there based on the magazine’s large
circulation in the state. 107 The individual defendants, who resided and worked
for the magazine in Florida, contested personal jurisdiction, but the Court
found jurisdiction “proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida
101

See supra Section I.A.
For a history of this trilogy, see Resnik, supra note 9, at 1801.
103 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 20, at 21.
104 See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in
Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 214 (2014) (stating as conventional wisdom “that
national corporations with substantial operations in all fifty states (such as McDonald’s or Walmart)
would likely be subject to general personal jurisdiction in all fifty states”); cf. William M. Richman,
Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 614 n.88 (1993) (“General jurisdiction may
also exist over out-of-staters if their forum connections are very substantial. For example, most states will
have general jurisdiction over McDonalds.”).
105 See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (“The requirements of International Shoe . . .
must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.”).
106 465 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1984).
107 Id. at 785.
102
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conduct in California” because “California is the focal point both of the story
and of the harm suffered.” 108 Shirley Jones was thus able to sue all four
defendants together in California—and would have been able to do so in
Florida as well.
Although the expansion of personal jurisdiction during this period
tended to minimize its conflicts with aggregation, at least three
circumstances presented direct conflicts. Each was resolved in favor of
aggregation.
The first was personal jurisdiction over plaintiff class members.
Personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs is usually a trivial consideration because
plaintiffs consent to a forum’s adjudicatory authority by filing in that
forum. 109 Class actions, however, present a unique consideration because
unnamed class members do not have full party status and do not expressly
consent to their representatives’ choice of forum. 110 Class actions thus pit
class joinder against principles of personal jurisdiction.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court resolved this
tension in favor of joinder by holding that class action rules with sufficient
representational safeguards allow for personal jurisdiction over nonresident
class members even if they lack minimum contacts with the forum state. 111
The Court contrasted the burdens on defendants—who must hire counsel,
travel to the forum to appear under threat of a default judgment, and
generally risk a money judgment or injunction on the merits—with unnamed
class plaintiffs, who often may tag along to reap the advantages of the class
action with few risks. 112 The Court reasoned: “Because States place fewer
burdens upon absent class plaintiffs than they do upon absent defendants in
nonclass suits, the Due Process Clause need not and does not afford the
former as much protection from state-court jurisdiction as it does the
latter.” 113
The Court credited the risk that a class member’s legal claim might be
extinguished by the state court in a class proceeding. But the Court
concluded that class members’ interest in their claims was protected,
consistent with the due process principles underlying personal jurisdiction,
by the class requirements of adequate representation by class representatives,
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Id. at 789.
See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938) (stating that the plaintiff, “by his voluntary act
in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court”).
110 See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002) (“Nonnamed class members . . . may be
parties for some purposes and not for others.”).
111 472 U.S. 797, 808–12 (1985).
112 Id. at 808–10.
113 Id. at 811.
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notice, and the right of each class member to opt out to preserve their
individual litigation rights. 114 Critical to the Court’s reasoning was its
recognition that aggregation of class claims might be necessary to make
certain small-value claims viable for litigation.115 Shutts thus represents an
instance in which the Court directly confronted—and accommodated—the
often competing interests of personal jurisdiction and aggregation. 116
The second conflict between personal jurisdiction and aggregation
involved interpleader. 117 In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, the
Supreme Court held that the joinder of defendants in an interpleader action
was subject to the limits of personal jurisdiction under Pennoyer v. Neff. 118
The consequence was that a stakeholder invoking interpleader in a multistate
case could be subject to one judgment in the interpleader action, binding only
the resident claimants, and a separate judgment in an action brought by a
nonresident claimant for the same property, resulting in inconsistent or
excessive judgments against the stakeholder.119
Dunlevy was decided in an era well before International Shoe.
Accordingly, Congress stepped in to remedy the conflict between personal
jurisdiction and interpleader. Congress did so by providing a nationwideservice provision for interpleader actions in federal court to obviate personal
jurisdiction concerns (along with a requirement of minimal diversity and de
minimis amount in controversy to minimize subject matter jurisdiction
concerns). 120 The result was that interpleader actions in federal court could
114

Id. at 811–12.
Id. at 812–13.
116 Courts have tended to interpret Shutts as validating personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs for all
Rule 23 classes, see Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due Process:
Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 895–96 (1995), but the Court did
not—and has not—decided the personal jurisdiction implications for classes certified as (b)(1)
“mandatory” or (b)(2) “injunctive” classes in which there is no mandatory right to opt out, see Ticor Title
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (per curiam) (dismissing a writ of certiorari granted on this
question).
117 Bankruptcy, which presents aggregation needs similar to those of interpleader, has long allowed
nationwide personal jurisdiction over claimants to ensure full and fair adjudication of creditor rights to
the bankrupt estate. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d) (“The summons and complaint and all other process
except a subpoena may be served anywhere in the United States.”).
118 241 U.S. 518, 521–23 (1916).
119 See id.
120 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2012) (“In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under
section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order
restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court
affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order of
the court. Such process and order shall be . . . addressed to and served by the United States marshals for
the respective districts where the claimants reside or may be found.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (2012)
(providing for minimal diversity); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31
(1967) (confirming the constitutionality of minimal diversity).
115
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be pursued under nationwide personal jurisdiction, effectively side-stepping
state-based limits on personal jurisdiction to preserve the efficacy of
multistate interpleader. 121
The third conflict between personal jurisdiction and aggregation
involved a single plaintiff suing a single defendant on multiple claims under
the rules governing claim joinder, when some of the claims would subject
the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum but not others. 122 Forcing
separate lawsuits for such claims would be wasteful, especially if the claims
relate to each other or present overlapping evidence. Although personal
jurisdiction over a defendant is a claim-by-claim inquiry, 123 courts have
generally exercised “pendent personal jurisdiction” over the defendant with
respect to all claims related to a claim brought under a federal statute that
provides for nationwide service of process. 124 Indeed, all federal courts of
appeals to have considered the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction in
this context have adopted it. 125 Courts are in more disagreement if the anchor
claim entitles the court to personal jurisdiction under service rules restricted

121 See Chafee, supra note 64, at 1136 (“[A]n interpleader suit will not give complete relief to the
stakeholder unless the entire controversy can be settled in the interpleader proceeding.”).
122 See William D. Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 VILL. L. REV.
56, 56–57 (1965); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 104, at 244.
123 See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1069.7 (4th ed.
2015) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER 4th ed.] (“[A] plaintiff also must secure personal jurisdiction over
a defendant with respect to each claim she asserts.”). Interestingly, the Supreme Court, however, has
tended to characterize specific jurisdiction as a case-linked doctrine. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017) (discussing the relationship between the “suit” and the
forum); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (“[T]he defendant’s suit-related conduct must
create a substantial connection with the forum State.”) (emphasis added); id. at 1121 n.6 (calling specific
jurisdiction “case-linked jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is unclear how the Court’s
phrasing might inform its approach to pendent personal jurisdiction.
124 See James S. Cochran, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal
Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1471–72 (1986); Jon Heller, Note, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and
Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 116 (1989) (“For the past twenty years, courts
have universally allowed such exercises of ‘pendent personal jurisdiction.’”).
125 See Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2004).
For a history of the doctrine, see Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal
Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1632–42 (2001).
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by state borders, 126 and most courts will not extend pendent personal
jurisdiction to unrelated claims. 127
Pendent personal jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine grounded in the
accommodation of aggregation. 128 As the Ninth Circuit recently wrote:
When a defendant must appear in a forum to defend against one claim, it is often
reasonable to compel that defendant to answer other claims in the same suit
arising out of a common nucleus of operative facts. We believe that judicial
economy, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and overall convenience of the
parties is best served by adopting this doctrine. 129

Certainly, pendent personal jurisdiction imposes no practical burden on a
defendant already properly before the forum court on a related claim brought
by the same party in the same case. 130 Pendent personal jurisdiction is widely
accepted as constitutional, if not always statutorily authorized.131

126 See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 104, at 245. The policies underlying pendent personal
jurisdiction seem to apply equally to related claims falling under a nationwide service statute and related
claims that do not. See 6 WRIGHT & MILLER 3d ed., supra note 63, § 1478 (making the case for pendent
personal jurisdiction over any claims asserted between existing parties over which the court already has
personal jurisdiction if the claims are related enough to qualify for supplemental jurisdiction); Simard,
supra note 125, at 1624 (same). After all, a defendant’s conduct that gives rise to liability to the plaintiff
in both State A and State B gives the defendant “fair warning” of (and the defendant has not structured
its primary conduct to avoid) the risk of suit in either state by the plaintiff. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (focusing on the importance of “fair warning” to the proper exercise
of personal jurisdiction).
127 See 4A WRIGHT & MILLER 4th ed., supra note 123, § 1069 (“[A] claim that is not part of the same
constitutional case is much more likely to involve different litigational strategies and may require very
different resources to defend against.”); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 104, at 244–45 (explaining that
“the defendant could not have foreseen being called to defend the unrelated claim in the forum and [thus]
considerations of federalism and comity would weigh against the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant for an unrelated claim”).
128 4A WRIGHT & MILLER 4th ed., supra note 123, § 1069.7 (“[P]endent personal jurisdiction must
be a creature of federal common law.”).
129 Action Embroidery, 368 F.3d at 1181; cf. Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d
Cir. 1973) (“Once the defendant is before the court, it matters little, from the point of view of procedural
due process, that he has become subject to the court’s ultimate judgment as a result of territorial or
extraterritorial process.”).
130 4A WRIGHT & MILLER 4th ed., supra note 123, § 1069.7 (“[A] defendant who already is before
the court to defend a federal claim is unlikely to be severely inconvenienced by being forced to defend a
state claim whose issues are nearly identical or substantially overlap the federal claim. Notions of fairness
to the defendant simply are not offended in this circumstance.”); Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction
in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1608 (1992) (“[A]ny inconvenience to the defendant
from having to defend the state law claim in that state can hardly be of constitutional significance.”);
Heller, supra note 124, at 129–30 (arguing that pendent claims cannot add any constitutionally significant
burdens).
131 Casad, supra note 130, at 1607 (“The existing nationwide service statutes apply to specific federal
claims and do not expressly authorize nationwide service for any other claims. . . . Nothing in the statutes
or rules, then, expressly authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction for the pendent claims.”);
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These three examples illustrate how Congress and the Supreme Court
modified personal jurisdiction doctrine to accommodate aggregation during
the era of expanding personal jurisdiction and rising complex litigation.
B. The Narrowing of General Jurisdiction
The story of personal jurisdiction took an abrupt turn in 2011, when the
Supreme Court began restricting the doctrine and creating, indirectly, more
significant tension between personal jurisdiction and aggregation. In
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court moved away
from the “continuous and systematic” formulation by stating that general
jurisdiction extends only when a defendant’s contacts are “so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” 132
The Court illustrated this demanding test with “paradigm” examples: an
individual’s state of domicile and a corporation’s state of incorporation or
headquarters. 133
Three years later, the Court doubled down on Goodyear’s “essentially
at home” test in Daimler AG v. Bauman. 134 The plaintiffs had sued Daimler,
a German company with its headquarters in Germany, in California for
conduct occurring wholly outside the United States. They did so on the
theory that Daimler’s wholly-owned subsidiary and exclusive U.S.
distributor sold substantial numbers of Daimler vehicles to California
(making it “the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California market”)
and had “multiple California-based facilities.” 135
The Court rejected this theory, clarifying that the essential part of
Goodyear’s test is the focus on where the defendant is “at home”: “[T]he
inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum
contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is
whether that corporation’s affiliations with the State are so continuous and
systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.” 136
In addition, the Court made Goodyear’s “paradigm” general
jurisdiction forums—an individual’s domicile or a corporation’s principal
Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction (Emory Legal Studies Research Paper, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119383 [https://perma.cc/SA5L-58FY].
132 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
133 Id. at 924.
134 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Three years after Daimler, the Court solidified its take on general
jurisdiction in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
135 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 750–52.
136 Id. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 751 (“[A] court may assert [general]
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation . . . only when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which
suit is brought are so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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place of business and place of incorporation—presumptively the exclusive
forums for such jurisdiction, subject only to the “exceptional case” in which
“a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such
a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” 137 The nature of
a “home,” the Court reasoned, is that it is limited to one or two places, even
if the defendant has substantial activity elsewhere. 138
Prior to Goodyear, the common understanding was that companies
doing substantial business in all fifty states—Daimler, Goodyear, Walmart,
and the like—would have been subject to general jurisdiction in every state.
Today, however, it is clear that those companies are subject to general
jurisdiction only (except in an extraordinary case) in their state of
incorporation and the state of their principal place of business. And, absent
exceptional circumstances, a foreign company will be subject to general
jurisdiction nowhere in the United States. 139
C. The Narrowing of Specific Jurisdiction
As general jurisdiction has narrowed, so has specific jurisdiction.
Specific jurisdiction has always depended upon the relationship between the
defendant, the claim, and the forum, but three recent cases have made that
triad considerably tighter.
In Walden v. Fiore, 140 Nevada residents sued in Nevada a Georgia
officer who had seized their money at an Atlanta airport. The Supreme Court
held that a defendant’s out-of-state conduct, undertaken with knowledge of
the effects it would have in the forum state, cannot establish minimum
contacts because such contacts must arise not simply out of the relationship
between the defendant and a forum plaintiff, 141 but “out of contacts that the
defendant himself creates with the forum.” 142 Walden thus necessitates a
direct link between the defendant and the forum that cannot be bridged by

137

Id. at 761 & n.19.
Id. at 762 n.20 (“[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the magnitude of the
defendant’s in-state contacts. General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can
scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
139 See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 1, at 1220.
140 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
141 Id. at 1123 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction. . . . Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum
State based on his own affiliation with the State . . . .”).
142 Id. at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138
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the plaintiff’s activities or presence, and it appears to scale back the
importance of the plaintiff’s connections to the forum. 143
In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 144 the Court splintered over
both the nature of personal jurisdiction and the limits of specific jurisdiction.
McIntyre, a UK company headquartered in the UK, manufactured metalshearing machines and sold them in the United States market through an
exclusive American distributor headquartered in Ohio. 145 All agreed that
although McIntyre did not target any state specifically, 146 it targeted the
United States market generally by attending national conferences in the
United States and by urging its distributor to sell as many machines as
possible in the United States. 147 One (but perhaps only one) of McIntyre’s
machines ended up in New Jersey, the state with by far the largest market for
metal-shearing machines. 148 There, the machine injured a New Jersey
resident, Robert Nicastro, who sued McIntyre in New Jersey state court. 149
The Supreme Court found no personal jurisdiction over McIntyre in
New Jersey. A plurality of four justices would have gone further, casting
personal jurisdiction as a doctrine of implied consent that requires
“submission” to state adjudicatory authority. 150 As the touchstone for specific
jurisdiction, the plurality would have rejected “[f]reeform notions of
fundamental fairness” and reasonable foreseeability in favor of a focus on
how “the defendant’s actions” manifest an intent to be subject to state
power. 151 Thus, the plurality would have reanimated the principle of state
sovereignty as the basis of personal jurisdiction: “[I]f another State [other
than the defendant’s home state] were to assert jurisdiction in an
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each
State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other
States.” 152
The dissent, by contrast, would have adhered to the modern focus on
fairness and reasonableness to the defendant instead of on notions of implied

143 Compare id. at 1122–23 (distancing personal jurisdiction from the plaintiff’s contacts), with
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (stating that the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum “may be so
manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence”).
144 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
145 Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
146 Id. at 886.
147 Id. at 895–98 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 885 (plurality opinion) (“In this case,
petitioner directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States.”).
148 See id. at 895, 898 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
150 Id. at 880–81.
151 Id. at 880, 882–83.
152 Id. at 884.
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consent to sovereign power. 153 “On what measure of reason and fairness,”
the dissent asked, “can it be considered undue to require McIntyre UK to
defend in New Jersey [where the accident occurred] as an incident of its
efforts to develop a market for its industrial machines anywhere and
everywhere in the United States?” 154 The dissent contended that “it would
undermine principles of fundamental fairness” to allow “a manufacturer
selling its products across the USA [to] evade jurisdiction in any and all
States, including the State where its defective product is distributed and
causes injury.” 155
The concurrence, disagreeing with both the plurality and the dissent,
and worrying about the unfairness of expansive personal jurisdiction to
defendants, 156 would have decided the case on the narrow grounds that prior
precedent withheld personal jurisdiction when just one product ended up in
a state through the stream of commerce, in the absence of affirmative efforts
by the defendant to take advantage of that state’s market.157
The combination of Walden and Nicastro restricts specific jurisdiction
to circumstances creating a direct link between the defendant and the forum.
Connections between the defendant and the forum that go through the
plaintiff or third-party intermediaries will only support specific jurisdiction
in the forum if the defendant’s own conduct creates a direct link to the forum.
Walden and Nicastro thus limited specific jurisdiction by requiring a tighter
connection between the forum and the defendant.
Neither Walden nor Nicastro addressed the necessary connection
between the forum and the claims. That issue was addressed in the Court’s
most recent personal jurisdiction case, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court, 158 decided in early 2017. There, plaintiffs from several different states
sued Bristol-Myers Squibb and its California distributor McKesson in
California state court. 159 The plaintiffs all claimed that they suffered injuries
after taking Bristol-Myers Squibb’s drug Plavix, which McKesson
distributed nationwide. 160 Bristol-Myers Squibb is a Delaware company
headquartered in New York, but it sells Plavix in large quantities to all fifty
states and maintains substantial operations in California. 161 The non153

Id. at 899–900 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 904.
155 Id. at 906.
156 Id. at 890–91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 888 (“None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the
kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”).
158 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
159 Id. at 1784–85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 1777 (opinion of the Court).
161 Id. at 1777–78; id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
154
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California plaintiffs, however, were prescribed, purchased, and took Plavix
outside of California and claimed injuries outside of California. 162
Before 2011, there was little doubt that the case would have been
allowed to proceed as filed in California because both McKesson and
Bristol-Myers Squibb would have been deemed subject to general
jurisdiction in California on all of the plaintiffs’ claims. 163 There was even
support for finding specific jurisdiction over the defendants for all claims on
the ground that the suit as a whole, or the non-California claims specifically,
were connected or related to the defendants’ California contacts.164
The Supreme Court, however, in an 8–1 decision, held that California
could not assert specific jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb to adjudicate
the non-California plaintiffs’ claims. The Court emphasized that, for specific
jurisdiction, the suit must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum. 165 The non-California plaintiffs’ claims, the Court reasoned,
did not arise out of or relate to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s contacts with
California. 166 The Court stated: “The mere fact that other plaintiffs were
prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly
sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State
to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.” 167 Accordingly,
because there was no “connection between the forum and the specific claims
at issue,” California could not assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant
regarding those claims. 168
Personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb for the non-California
claims failed in California even though no one doubted that personal
jurisdiction in California was proper for the identical claims of California
plaintiffs. In light of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s substantial contacts with the
state, no one contended that California was a logistically unfair or logistically
burdensome forum in which to adjudicate even the non-California claims;
counsel for Bristol-Myers Squibb even conceded that California was not an

162

Id. at 1778 (opinion of the Court).
Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1275 (“Until Goodyear, Bristol-Myers would almost certainly
have been subject to general jurisdiction in California, based simply on the scope and continuousness of
its contacts with the state: to wit, its nearly one billion dollars in sales of Plavix in California, its
registration to do business in the state, and therefore, its appointment of an agent to receive service of
process, and its operation of five offices and employment of some four-hundred people in the state.”).
164 See Brief for Petitioner at 18–20, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466)
(making this argument).
165 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
166 Id. at 1781–82.
167 Id. at 1781.
168 Id.
163
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unfair forum. 169 To explain this peculiarity, the Supreme Court, echoing the
sovereignty theory of the Nicastro plurality, returned to the “territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States” and reasoned that those
principles of interstate federalism sometimes work independently of any
practical burdens on defendants to restrict the adjudicatory authority of a
state. 170
After Bristol-Myers Squibb, then, specific jurisdiction requires a direct
link between not only the forum and the defendant but also between the
forum and the claim. That link cannot be bridged by the presence of nearly
identical joined claims that arose in the forum. Instead, interstate federalism
disempowers a state from exercising adjudicatory authority over claims
arising in other states. These restrictions on specific jurisdiction, coupled
with the restrictions on general jurisdiction, have an adverse effect on the
availability of joinder, as the next Part shows.
III. COLLISIONS AND EFFECTS
Today, general jurisdiction limits the forums that have all-purpose
jurisdiction over a defendant to at most two states, while specific jurisdiction
demands a close connection between the chosen forum and both the
defendant and the claim. This narrowing of personal jurisdiction affects the
various joinder mechanisms in a variety of ways.
A. Claim Joinder
Claim joinder is designed to be liberal, to encourage parties to assert all
claims and counterclaims (and some crossclaims) that they have between
them in the same lawsuit. 171 But the new personal jurisdiction restrictions
hamstring claim joinder.

169 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 891 (Cal. 2016). Bristol-Myers
Squibb instead argued that it was unfair that the plaintiffs could shop for “plaintiff-friendly” California
courts. See Pet. Writ Cert. at 30–32, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466)
(“[Plaintiffs should not be allowed] to shop claims with no causal connection to a defendant’s California
activities to what their counsel view as the more plaintiff-friendly California courts. . . . Plaintiffs should
not be allowed to take their case to the most hospitable forum they can think of.”). The Court did not
appear to credit this argument.
170 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81. It is difficult to understand why interstate federalism
was so important in Bristol-Myers Squibb; because the claims were all essentially the same, the states
should not have cared which state with an interest adjudicated them. Indeed, the facts of Bristol-Myers
Squibb suggest that other factors supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction in California should have
been compelling, including “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies[] and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). The
Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb ignored these factors.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 22–32.
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In particular, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s emphasis on a connection
between the claim and the forum calls into doubt the continued viability of
pendent personal jurisdiction. Pendent personal jurisdiction depends not
upon a connection between the forum and the claim but upon the connection
between the forum and a different claim. The rationale is that when a
defendant is already properly subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum on
one forum-related claim, no additional burden or unfairness is caused by
forcing the defendant to litigate related non-forum claims in the same case.
But that was the precise line of reasoning rejected in Bristol-Myers Squibb,
which did not rely on the unfairness to the defendant and instead required a
“connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue” that could
not be bridged by the joinder of in-state claims. 172
True, Bristol-Myers Squibb confronted nonresident plaintiffs asserting
non-forum claims, leaving open the possibility that, in a pure claim-joinder
case, the plaintiff’s residence in the forum state might support personal
jurisdiction over a claim arising in a different state. 173 That reasoning,
however, is less certain after Walden, which demanded more than just the
plaintiff’s residency. Instead, Walden required that the defendant create
contacts with the forum to support each claim. 174 Bristol-Myers Squibb and
Walden thus call into question the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction
over any non-forum claim regardless of the claimant’s residency.
Bristol-Myers Squibb has the additional effect of treating the defendant
more favorably than the plaintiff with respect to claim joinder. While BristolMyers Squibb appears to limit pendent personal jurisdiction over claims
joined by a plaintiff, it does not limit personal jurisdiction over counterclaims
asserted by the defendant against the plaintiff. That is because the plaintiff is
deemed to have consented to the personal jurisdiction of the state in which
the plaintiff filed, and that consent extends to counterclaims by the
defendant. 175 As a result, plaintiffs will face jurisdictional limitations in
joining out-of-state claims against defendants, but defendants will face few
such restrictions in joining any and all counterclaims against the plaintiff.
B. Plaintiff Joinder
In nonclass cases, joined plaintiffs’ claims arising in different states
directly implicate the holding of Bristol-Myers Squibb, which will protect

172

Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81.
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (stating that the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum
“may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence”).
174 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122–23 (2014).
175 See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938).
173
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the defendant from the exercise of specific jurisdiction. 176 Ironically, this is
the case regardless of where the plaintiffs choose to sue. A California
plaintiff injured in California could sue in California under specific
jurisdiction, while a Texas plaintiff injured by the same defendant in exactly
the same way in Texas could only sue the defendant in Texas under specific
jurisdiction. Neither may join in the other’s case, even if the defendant
already expects to be sued for the same conduct in both states. Specific
jurisdiction demands this result even if the Texas plaintiff has since moved
to California and is now a California resident.
In representative actions like class actions, the specific jurisdiction
inquiry is trickier. 177 Some have asserted that, after Bristol-Myers Squibb,
“multistate or nationwide class actions based on state tort law are likely off
the table in almost any state or federal court that does not have general
jurisdiction over the defendant.” 178 If the class action is no more than the sum
of its parts—a grouping of individual claimants—then a straightforward
application of Bristol-Myers Squibb seems clear: commonality among the
claims would be as insufficient in class actions as in mass actions to bring
non-forum claims into the personal jurisdiction fold. 179
Other commentators, espousing a different view, assert that a class
action is an entity with its own legal status and is more than the sum of its
parts, not unlike how artificial entities like corporations or partnerships are
more than the sum of their shareholders or members. 180 The law treats
business entities as independent entities in many ways, including for
176 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1282 (“[A]fter Bristol-Myers, in most instances it is unlikely that
plaintiffs could maintain a . . . mass joinder [with plaintiffs from multiple states] in state court anywhere
other than the defendant’s home state(s).”).
177 Collective actions are representative actions but, because the Court has not explained how much
class action rules apply to collective actions, the analysis of personal jurisdiction as applied to collective
actions is highly speculative. See generally Daniel C. Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective
Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275 (2009) (exploring the
application of Rule 23 principles to collective actions).
178 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1256.
179 Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“The effect of the Court’s opinion today is to eliminate nationwide mass actions in any State
other than those in which a defendant is ‘essentially at home.’”). But see, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured
Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *12 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017) (holding
Bristol-Myers Squibb inapplicable to class actions); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc.,
No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (distinguishing Bristol-Myers
Squibb from class actions).
180 See Sergio J. Campos, The Class Action as Trust, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2016);
Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 385 (2012); David L.
Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917–21 (1998);
Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 599 (1987); cf. Robert G.
Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 653 (2014) (discussing an
“external” view of certain classes that have inherent unity).
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jurisdictional purposes. Corporations, for example, are citizens of their states
of incorporation and principal place of business for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, 181 and, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, they are subject to
general jurisdiction in those same states, even if no shareholder is a citizen
of either state. 182
Even a class action can have an independent entity status for some
jurisdictional purposes. For diversity jurisdiction, both Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA) and non-CAFA classes are treated, in some ways, like
independent entities. 183 As Shutts held, the representational quality of class
actions lessens the strictures of personal jurisdiction over represented
claimants. 184 And the Court has held that class claims are not mooted by the
mooting of the named representative’s claims. 185
It is not an unreasonable stretch from these precepts to argue that certain
class actions that act more like entities should be treated differently from the
ordinary joinder of plaintiffs for purposes of establishing personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The difference would be to treat the class
representatives’ individual claims as establishing, for all class claims,
specific jurisdiction over the defendant. 186 Such a theory might be enough to
take some class actions out from underneath Bristol-Myers Squibb. Still,
such a theory seems to be in tension with the Supreme Court’s current trend
narrowing personal jurisdiction and its current skepticism of class
aggregation.
That leaves plaintiffs from different states with the possibility of joining
together through ordinary joinder or in a representative action to sue where
181

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012).
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (explaining that the “paradigm” locations
for general jurisdiction over a corporation are the state of incorporation and the state of its principal place
of business). Personal jurisdiction over partnerships is less clear, though some courts have concluded that
partnerships should be treated like corporations. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d
44, 50 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he form of organization by which a defendant does business is irrelevant” to
personal jurisdiction and thus there is “no reason to distinguish between corporate and non-corporate”
defendants.); see also Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 332 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding
an unincorporated association to be subject to general jurisdiction in the state of its principal place of
business). The Class Action Fairness Act states that, “[f]or purposes of this subsection and section 1453,
an unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its principal place
of business and the State under whose laws it is organized.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10).
183 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (specifying that the entire amount claimed by a CAFA class is
the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction), with Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
340 (1969) (looking only to the named representatives’ citizenships for determining the citizenship of a
non-CAFA class for diversity jurisdiction purposes).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 111–16.
185 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399, 401–02 (1975).
186 Wood, supra note 180, at 616 (“[T]he contacts supporting the individual’s claim against the
defendants [in a representational class action] should support the entire class’s claims.”).
182
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the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.187 After Daimler, however,
the number of forums available for general jurisdiction over domestic
defendants is limited to no more than two in all but the exceptional case,188
and the defendant’s home state may be highly inconvenient or otherwise
unappealing for the vast majority of individual plaintiffs. 189 In cases
involving a foreign defendant, the number of domestic forums able to
exercise general jurisdiction is likely to be zero.190 In such cases, plaintiffs
wishing to aggregate from different states must file in a foreign country,
which may not allow the kind of liberal party joinder preferred in the United
States. 191 Foreign defendants, like the hypothetical Wow Chemicals, could
use the new restrictions on personal jurisdiction to escape plaintiff
aggregation entirely. 192 To the extent aggregation is the only realistic vehicle
for rendering plaintiffs’ claims economically viable, a defeat of aggregation
could mean a defeat of the claims themselves.
C. Defendant Joinder
Current personal jurisdiction doctrine curtails the ability of plaintiffs to
join defendants in the same lawsuit. Before 2011, plaintiffs relied on general
jurisdiction, which allowed them to sue defendants in any forum where all
defendants had continuous and systematic contacts regardless of where the
injury occurred. The prevailing wisdom was that general jurisdiction was
broad enough to subject most national corporations to general jurisdiction in
187 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017) (“Our decision
does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together in a consolidated action
in the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS.”).
188 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 748, 761 n.19 (2014).
189 See Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1294 (“The types of corporations that find themselves as
mass-tort defendants—Big Tobacco, Big Pharma, Big Anything—are often major political and social
players in their home states. Even if they did not choose their headquarters to minimize litigation risk,
they may have powerful lobbies in the state legislature and, over time, may seek protective substantive
or procedural legislation and work to help shape the (often elected) state judiciary. Similarly, local jurors
may not be eager to put a major local employer and economic engine out of business.”). Admittedly, any
inconvenience is likely to be minimal for represented class members. See Wood, supra note 180, at 615
(“[T]he nonresident unnamed class members need do little or nothing during the pendency of the suit.
The class device itself protects them from inconvenience.”).
190 See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Foreign businesses with principal places of business outside the United States may
never be subject to general jurisdiction in this country even though they have continuous and systematic
contacts within the United States.”); Dodge & Dodson, supra note 1, at 1220 (“For alien defendants, by
contrast, the likelihood is that no U.S. state will be able to exercise general jurisdiction.”).
191 See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of
American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) (noting that European aggregation “stops
markedly short” of American aggregation).
192 For more on personal jurisdiction over aliens, including the argument that specific jurisdiction
over aliens should be determined by a national contacts approach, see Dodge & Dodson, supra note 1.
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every state. 193 In Shutts, for example, the defendant challenged personal
jurisdiction in Kansas over absent nonresident class members, but not over
the defendant itself, almost certainly because the defendant believed itself
subject to general jurisdiction in Kansas based on its substantial contacts
with the state.194
Today, however, general jurisdiction is a far less viable option. After
Daimler, general jurisdiction is limited to the one or two states (if that) where
the defendant is essentially at home. Those states may overlap with the
homes of other defendants, but such overlap is likely to be very limited. 195 In
its absence, defendant joinder in a state where all plaintiffs can also join
together is unlikely without the defendants’ consent. 196
Plaintiffs willing to trade less plaintiff joinder for more defendant
joinder may have more options, but even those are quite limited. For
example, plaintiffs injured in a single state could sue multiple defendants in
that state if the state has specific jurisdiction over both defendants, or specific
jurisdiction over some defendants and general jurisdiction over the rest. In
Bristol-Myers Squibb, for example, plaintiffs injured in California could sue
the manufacturer under specific jurisdiction (because of the manufacturer’s
minimum contacts with California) and the distributor under either specific
or general jurisdiction (because the distributor sold the product in California
and was headquartered there). 197 The Court predicted that plaintiffs injured
in other states could join together in those states to sue both defendants
together on similar theories of personal jurisdiction. 198
That was likely true in Bristol-Myers Squibb, but Nicastro complicates
this theory for the future. In Nicastro, five justices determined that a foreign
193

See supra text accompanying notes 98–100.
See Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1284 (“Yet after Bristol-Myers, it is difficult to see how the
Kansas court could have had personal jurisdiction over Phillips Petroleum for the vast majority of the
class members’ claims.”); see also, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288
(1980) (explaining that the national defendants did not consent to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma).
195 Delaware, the one state with many common corporate charters, offers the most likely place for
defendant joinder, though it is possible that restrictive forum selection clauses could limit the availability
even of a forum that would have general jurisdiction. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S.
585, 595 (1991) (upholding restrictive forum selection clauses generally).
196 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“It will make it impossible to bring a nationwide mass action in state court against defendants
who are ‘at home’ in different States.”); id. at 1789 (“After this case, it is difficult to imagine where it
might be possible to bring a nationwide mass action against two or more defendants headquartered and
incorporated in different States.”).
197 See id. at 1778 (opinion of the Court) (describing the defendants).
198 Id. at 1783 (“Our decision does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining
together in a consolidated action in the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS. . . . Alternatively,
the plaintiffs who are residents of a particular State . . . could probably sue together in their home
States.”).
194
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manufacturer could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in a state in which
it made no affirmative efforts to market and in which only a single product
ended up, even though the manufacturer targeted all states generally and the
injury occurred in the forum state. 199 The plurality would have further denied
specific jurisdiction even with substantial sales into the forum state.200 Under
specific jurisdiction, the plaintiffs could have sued the distributor, but not the
manufacturer, in the state of injury. To add insult to injury, the distributor
went bankrupt, and the plaintiff was unable to sue the manufacturer in the
manufacturer’s home forum. 201
The manufacturer in Nicastro was a foreign manufacturer, but nothing
prevents a domestic manufacturer from using the same business model to
outsource marketing and distribution to avoid specific jurisdiction in states
where its product causes injury. This strategy would leave the distributor
subject to personal jurisdiction only in the state of injury and the distributor’s
home state, and would leave the manufacturer subject to personal jurisdiction
only in its home state. The area of overlap, even with substantial
disaggregation of plaintiffs, is likely to be minimal, if it exists at all.202
D. Case Joinder
The two main mechanisms for case joinder in federal courts are
consolidation and multidistrict litigation. Each offers appreciable benefits of
aggregation, but each is afflicted by the recent trend in personal jurisdiction.
Consolidation requires that the cases already be before the same
court. 203 It therefore suffers from all the same frailties imposed by personal
jurisdiction on plaintiff joinder and defendant joinder.
Multidistrict litigation (MDL), in which many cases from different
courts are transferred to a single court for coordinated pretrial proceedings,
is a more curious mechanism. Although personal jurisdiction limits normally
prohibit transfer of a case to a forum that would lack personal jurisdiction

199 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882–84 (2011) (plurality opinion); id. at 888
(Breyer, J., concurring).
200 Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–84 (plurality opinion).
201 Id. at 896 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202 Bristol-Myers Squibb and Nicastro were both product-based tort cases, but their personal
jurisdiction limits affect all kinds of cases. An example is mass-copyright litigation, when a copyright
licensee or holder sues a number of potential infringers at once, sometimes thousands of them, in what
are “essentially inverted mass tort cases.” Jason R. LaFond, Personal Jurisdiction and Joinder in Mass
Copyright Troll Litigation, 71 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 51, 52 (2012). Plaintiffs usually claim that all
defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in a single forum of the plaintiff’s choice because each
claim is related to at least one claim that arises in the state, id. at 56–57, but this is unlikely to be allowed
today under Bristol-Myers Squibb.
203 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
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over a defendant had the case been filed there,204 some courts have
characterized the MDL statute as authorizing nationwide jurisdiction under
the Fifth Amendment, 205 thereby obviating the problems of state-based limits
of personal jurisdiction.
Yet it is hard to justify this view, both on legal and practical grounds.
The MDL statute is a venue provision, not an authorization of personal
jurisdiction. The statute is codified in a section of the U.S. Code devoted to
venue, and its language mirrors other venue transfer rules, 206 rules to which
the limits of personal jurisdiction apply. 207 The statute contains neither a
service provision nor the kind of language that Congress normally uses to
prescribe nationwide personal jurisdiction. 208
Some have argued that personal jurisdiction limits in an MDL
transferee court are irrelevant because the transfer is only for pretrial
proceedings. 209 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML),
though not entirely clear on this point, appears to agree that the pretrial focus
means that MDL consolidation is “simply not encumbered by considerations
of in personam jurisdiction.” 210
But as a practical matter, the pretrial focus, with its implicit promise of
remand to the transferor court for final disposition, is a charade. Indeed, two
leading MDL scholars call resort to the “temporary” nature of MDL a
“masquerade[] . . . to get around the limits . . . on a federal court’s personal
jurisdiction.” 211 Transferee courts can decide dispositive motions, including
motions for summary judgment, 212 and can approve global settlements for all

204

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960).
See Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2010); In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993).
206 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (allowing consolidation in any federal district when “such
proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions”).
207 See Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3228023 [https://perma.cc/
Z2QM-AGA2]; see also Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 338–39 (1960) (rejecting venue transfer
under § 1404(a) because the defendant could not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the transferee
court).
208 Compare supra note 207 and accompanying text, with infra note 224.
209 Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1169
(2017); see Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34 (1998).
210 In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976); In re Library Editions
of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
211 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1297.
212 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b); 15 WRIGHT & MILLER 4th ed., supra note 123, § 3866.
205
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cases. 213 As a result, transfers are usually permanent; more than 97% of MDL
cases are resolved by the transferee court.214
The interaction between personal jurisdiction and MDL transfer is by
no means clear. By some estimates, more than one-third of the current federal
docket—comprising tens of thousands of individual cases—is multidistrict
litigation, 215 with all the advantages such aggregation entails. Those
advantages are under threat from the Supreme Court’s stringent take on
personal jurisdiction.
Personal jurisdiction’s effects on case joinder, as well as party and
claim joinder, erode the salutary benefits of aggregation. The next Part
explores ways to regain those benefits.
IV. EXPANDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION FOR AGGREGATION
The solution in federal court to these tensions between personal
jurisdiction and aggregation is to expand the statutory or rule authorization
for federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in aggregation cases.
Arguments for expanding personal jurisdiction in federal court are not new;
others have made such arguments with respect to all cases, or to all federal
question cases, or to cases involving aliens. 216 Here, I chart a narrower
213

Burch, supra note 34, at 414.
Bradt, supra note 209, at 1206.
215 See id. at 1165.
216 See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1982) (arguing for the wholesale elimination of
state-based personal jurisdiction in federal courts); Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear,
and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1274–75 (2011)
(suggesting that federal courts be authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over both nonfederal and
federal claims when no state can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Gary B. Born,
Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 37 (1987)
(using international norms to argue that aliens should be subject to a national contacts approach to
personal jurisdiction); Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and
Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 820 (1988) (aliens); Dodge
& Dodson, supra note 1 (arguing for nationwide personal jurisdiction over aliens); Maryellen Fullerton,
Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
11, 38–61 (1984) (exploring the constitutionality of a national contacts approach to personal jurisdiction
in federal courts); Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate Defendants—
Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 435 & n.23 (1984) (arguing that federal courts
should apply a national contacts test to personal jurisdiction over aliens in federal question cases); Daniel
Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs,
19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713, 717 (2015) (“propos[ing] that federal district courts be given personal
jurisdiction in federal question cases to the full extent allowed by the Fifth Amendment”); Graham C.
Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 86 (1983) (arguing that
federal courts should “apply the minimum contacts test to the alien’s contacts with the nation as a whole
rather than with the particular forum state”); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful
Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
455, 456 (2004) (arguing that “jurisdiction should be constitutional [under the Fifth Amendment] on the
214
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course: I argue for expanding personal jurisdiction in federal courts to cases
involving aggregation. This Part sketches some options, explains why they
are constitutional, and anticipates some objections.
A. The Subconstitutional Fix
The typical way to establish the scope of personal jurisdiction in federal
courts is by authorizing service of process. 217 The general authorization is in
Rule 4(k)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that
“service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant” when the
defendant “is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state where the district court is located.” 218 Rule 4(k)(1) thus limits
personal jurisdiction in federal court to the scope that would exist in the state
in which the federal court sits, 219 and it is this state-based limitation that
causes many of the aggregation problems identified in this Article.
Rule 4(k) contains some exceptions, but they are limited. Personal
jurisdiction over defendants “joined under Rule 14 or 19” is established
when they are served “not more than 100 miles from where the summons
was issued,” which could be across state lines. 220 And service on a defendant
sued on a federal claim establishes personal jurisdiction to the full reach of
the Constitution if no individual state would have personal jurisdiction.221
These exceptions offer little utility for the much broader range of multistate
joinder available in many other cases.
basis of effects in the United States”); Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1303–04 (2014) (arguing for nationwide service for federal courts based on
political legitimacy); A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts,
87 DENV. U. L. REV. 325, 325 (2010) (arguing for nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal courts);
Janice Toran, Federalism, Personal Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TUL. L. REV. 758, 770–88 (1984)
(arguing for nationwide personal jurisdiction over aliens); Howard M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide
Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1149 (1989)
(arguing for national jurisdiction in all federal question cases).
217 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1) (specifying the conditions under which “[s]erving a summons or filing
a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant”); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.
Ct. 1549, 1555 (2017) (“Congress’ typical mode of providing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction has
been to authorize service of process.”). Perhaps the federal courts could adopt a federal common law of
personal jurisdiction outside the confines of existing Rule 4, but the Supreme Court has expressed doubt
about the propriety of that possibility. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolff Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97,
109 (1987).
218 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
219 About half the states have long-arm statutes that extend to the full reach of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Laura Beck Knoll, Personal Jurisdiction over Maritime Defendants:
Daimler, Walden, and Rule 4(k)(2), 40 TUL. MAR. L.J. 103, 121 (2015), but the states cannot authorize
personal jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution allows.
220 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B).
221 Id. 4(k)(2). This provision does not cover plaintiffs—like the hypothetical plaintiffs in the Wow
Chemicals example—suing on state-law grounds.
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To safeguard the benefits of aggregation from the threat of personal
jurisdiction, then, an amendment is needed. The rule recognizes that
Congress can supply broader personal jurisdiction where it wishes, 222 as
Congress has with a number of specific statutes, including, most relevantly
here, interpleader. 223 Whether amendment is by rule or statute is irrelevant
for my purposes. What are more important are the content and the principles
behind it.
The broadest grant of personal jurisdiction to federal courts would be
to allow nationwide personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the
Constitution over all parties and claims in a multiclaim or multiparty lawsuit.
This would provide maximum flexibility for aggregation purposes by
essentially removing all personal jurisdiction barriers to aggregation, with
the possible exception of alien defendants whose connections to the United
States are so attenuated that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal
court would violate the Constitution.
The breadth of this formulation could lead to some odd results from the
perspective of personal jurisdiction. For example, a single plaintiff from
California could sue a single defendant from Oregon in Florida federal court
for two claims arising in California; based solely on the presence of multiple
claims, Florida would have personal jurisdiction despite the lack of any
Florida connection to the parties or the claims.
But even were such oddities to occur under the broad version of
nationwide personal jurisdiction, they would be largely corrected by venue
constraints. The venue statute imposes an independent limitation on the
propriety of the forum, restricting venue to (1) a district in a state where all
defendants reside, (2) a district “in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated,” or (3) a district where “any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction” if no proper venue
otherwise exists. 224 Thus, the venue statute would limit proper venue in the
case above to a federal court in Oregon (where the defendant resides) or a
federal court in California (where the claims arose).
It is true that when the first two venue prongs cannot apply, oddities can
return under the third prong. Say instead the plaintiff above sues two
defendants, one from Oregon for a claim arising wholly in Oregon, and one
from Washington for a claim arising wholly in Washington. Then, only the
third venue provision would apply and, under a nationwide personal

222
223
224
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Id. 4(k)(1)(C).
See infra text accompanying notes 239–43.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012).
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jurisdiction regime, would allow the suit to be filed in Florida under both
personal jurisdiction and proper venue.
However, if the claims arise wholly in different states because they are
unrelated or share no common question of law or fact, then Rule 20 will
disallow joinder of the defendants 225 and prevent the case from proceeding
in Florida. For those cases that do survive the joinder rules, the venue transfer
statute will allow defendants to transfer venue out of the highly inconvenient
forum of Florida and to a more convenient forum on the West Coast. 226
Plaintiffs could try to use nationwide personal jurisdiction to shop for
particularly favorable state law, 227 but the Constitution imposes limits on the
application of the law of states with no connection to the dispute. 228 And, as
other commentators have proposed, Congress could easily change the choice
of law rules for venue transfer in this context to protect against unfair lawshopping. 229 If Congress does not, the choice of law issue could even be
resolved by federal common law. 230 For these reasons, the venue statutes and
choice of law doctrines can control most troubling aspects of nationwide
personal jurisdiction in multiparty or multiclaim cases.
Admittedly, some oddities might linger, but it is unclear whether the
costs of those residual oddities would outweigh the simplicity of a
nationwide jurisdiction regime and the benefits of aggregation. Regardless,
such costs are no argument for retaining a narrowed form of personal
jurisdiction. At most, they merely suggest consideration of more modest
expansions of personal jurisdiction.
Several permutations are possible. For example, the doctrine of pendent
personal jurisdiction could be codified to allow a federal court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant as to all claims asserted by a single
plaintiff if the federal court has personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k) as to at
least one of those claims. Or, personal jurisdiction could be expanded to track
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, effectively providing for personal
jurisdiction whenever the rules allow joinder and subject matter jurisdiction,
as long as personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k) is proper for one of the
original claims. 231 Like the supplemental jurisdiction statute, and consistent
225

FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
227 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519–21 (1990).
228 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310–11 (1981) (stating that a state with “only an
insignificant contact” cannot constitutionally apply its own law).
229 See Sachs, supra note 216, at 1303–04.
230 See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013) (providing for a special
choice of law rule for venue transfers based on forum selection clauses).
231 Some courts have read the supplemental jurisdiction statute as implicitly authorizing personal
jurisdiction, see Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 796,
226
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with the joinder-based protections against prejudice, 232 such joinder-based
personal jurisdiction could even be discretionary, such that a court could
decline to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant for a particular
claim if doing so would be unfair or intrude upon notions of interstate
federalism.
I do not argue here for a particular formulation of expanded personal
jurisdiction for aggregation cases. Rather, I merely argue that personal
jurisdiction should be expanded beyond its current state-based limits. 233 Such
expansion would reap the considerable advantages of multistate aggregation
and eliminate the restrictions on aggregation imposed by a doctrine that has
little to do with it.
B. Constitutionality
Any such expansion of personal jurisdiction exercised by federal courts
is almost certainly constitutional. Although the Supreme Court has never
decided whether the Constitution permits federal courts to exercise
nationwide personal jurisdiction, 234 the Court has hinted in the affirmative, 235
and commentators nearly uniformly agree that the Constitution permits
federal courts to exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction based upon a
national contacts test. 236

804 (N.D. Ohio 1998), but there is little statutory support for that reading, 4A WRIGHT & MILLER 4th ed.,
supra note 123, § 1069.7 (“Neither the plain meaning of this statute, which shows it to be a subject matter
jurisdiction provision, nor its legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended Section
1367 to include personal jurisdiction.”).
232 See supra note 76; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012).
233 It appears the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is primed to take up discussion of such an
expansion. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules 335–42 (April 10, 2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisorycommittee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2018 [https://perma.cc/JCK4-YF2R] (discussing possible
amendments to expand Rule 4(k)).
234 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017) (leaving “open the
question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a federal court”); Omni Capital Int’l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5
(1987) (reserving the same question); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (same).
235 See, e.g., Miss. Pub’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (stating that “Congress could
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States”); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. 300, 328
(1838) (stating that “Congress might have authorized civil process from any circuit court, to have run into
any state of the Union”); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553–54 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Fifth Amendment requires minimum contacts with the United States as a whole).
236 See, e.g., Dodge & Dodson, supra note 1, at 1236 (calling this “an easy proposition”); Sachs,
supra note 216, at 1319–20 (calling the question “about as settled by precedent as it could be”); see also
Casad, supra note 130, at 1602 & n.68 (citing cases). For a recent and careful analysis concluding that
the Fifth Amendment looks to national contacts, see Nash, supra note 131.
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Congress has provided for nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal
court on a number of specified federal claims. 237 Lower courts consistently
find these statutes constitutional and apply a national contacts test, freed
from state borders, to evaluate personal jurisdiction under such statutes. 238
Importantly, Congress and the rulemakers have provided for
nationwide personal jurisdiction in some contexts specifically for purposes
of facilitating joinder, such as in interpleader, 239 certain property claims, 240
and bankruptcy. 241 In narrow joinder contexts already surveyed, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure already allow for expanded personal jurisdiction
beyond the normal state-based limits. 242 And in the past, both the Standing
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States and the American
Law Institute have proposed nationwide service for all federal question cases
in federal courts for purposes of facilitating joinder. 243 As the Supreme Court
once observed: “There is, therefore, nothing in the Constitution which
forbids Congress to enact that . . . [the district court] in which the suit may
237 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2012); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (2012); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2012); Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77v (2012); Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012); Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (2012); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (2012);
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2012); Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012); Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 921 (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2012); Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 362
(2012).
238 See Heller, supra note 124, at 125 (reporting that “every federal Court of Appeals” has applied a
nationwide contacts test to nationwide service statutes and that “no federal court” has found a nationwide
service statute unconstitutional). But see Terry Park, Comment, National vs. Forum Contacts: Does
ERISA’s Nationwide Service of Process Automatically Constitute Federal Personal Jurisdiction?, 32 SW.
U. L. REV. 527, 528–29 (2003) (stating that circuits are split on whether the ERISA provision gives rise
to nationwide personal jurisdiction dependent upon minimum contacts with the United States as a whole).
239 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1397, 2361 (2012).
240 28 U.S.C. §§ 1655, 1692 (2012).
241 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(d), (f). The benefit is that “any necessary litigation [can be adjudicated
together] in a single forum before a judge familiar with the debtor’s business and financial affairs.” Jeffrey
T. Ferriell, The Perils of Nationwide Service of Process in a Bankruptcy Context, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1199, 1200 (1991).
242 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). As justification, the Advisory Committee Notes state: “The Fifth
Amendment requires that any defendant have affiliating contacts with the United States sufficient to
justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over that party.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 advisory committee’s
note to 1993 amendment.
243 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237, 266, 273–74, 280 (1989); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1314(d) & note
(1969) (“This provision is essential if venue is laid at the place where the events occurred and some
defendants are not amenable to process in that state.”). For more on the proposed amendment to Rule 4,
see Erichson, supra note 216, at 1117–18 (1989).
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be brought, shall, by process served anywhere in the United States, have the
power to bring before it all the parties necessary to its decision.” 244
For these reasons, a joinder-based authorization of personal jurisdiction
in federal court, expanded beyond state-based boundaries, would boast
significant historical precedent and would almost surely be constitutional.
C. Counterpoints
Some downsides to expanded personal jurisdiction in aggregation cases
are worth considering, though they ultimately do not carry the day.
One is that expanded opportunities for aggregation in federal court,
compared to more limited opportunities for aggregation in state court, might
induce vertical forum shopping by encouraging plaintiffs to file in federal
court. Such vertical forum shopping would not pose a constitutional
problem, 245 and it would not seem to pose a normative problem in light of the
current trends favoring the “federalization” of aggregation.246 Further, it is
unlikely that the selection magnitude is great enough to distort the workable
allocation of cases between state and federal courts. Many aggregated cases
based on diversity or federal question jurisdiction are likely to be eligible for
federal jurisdiction in disaggregated form, and their aggregation will lighten,
rather than exacerbate, the burden on the federal docket. Some aggregation
will allow federal jurisdiction where it did not exist previously, such as in
cases of supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse state claims, or in cases
involving small claims aggregated under claim joinder to meet the amountin-controversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction, but the impact of these
cases is likely to be quite small. 247
A more serious downside is the expansion of opportunities for
horizontal forum shopping among various federal courts around the country.
But, as I have argued, the venue and choice of law rules, combined with
defendants’ ability to restrict forums through forum selection clauses,
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United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878).
See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[T]he constitutional
doctrine announced in Erie . . . would not prevent Congress or its rule-making delegate from authorizing
a district court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an ordinary diversity case although
the state court would not . . . .”).
246 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1258 (arguing that doctrines shifting cases into MDL are
“consistent with the broader trend toward federalization of mass litigation”); Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1358 (2006) (discussing trends
toward judicial federalization).
247 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
tbl.C-2 (June 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary-june2017 [https://perma.cc/QU2N-LGVK].
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ameliorate much of that evil. 248 In addition, the Supreme Court has made
clear that personal jurisdiction is largely blind to choice of law problems. 249
At bottom, however, the existence of the state differences that lead to
horizontal forum shopping is a product of our federal system that is tolerated
both because of respect for state sovereignty250 and because of the advantages
of convenience and efficiency, 251 the same values underlying aggregation.
In addition, it is important to note that restrictive personal jurisdiction
presently exacerbates forum shopping opportunities for defendants.
Defendants can consent to personal jurisdiction in any forum for any case,
no matter the rules of personal jurisdiction, and they can seek transfer to
those forums. 252 In MDL proceedings, for example, defendants can cherrypick favorable cases to try as bellwether trials by consenting to personal
jurisdiction, while objecting to personal jurisdiction over less favorable
cases. 253 For putative class actions, defendants can hold a “reverse auction”
for the most favorable settlement proposal, and then consent to have the case
filed in the forum most likely to accept that settlement. 254 American
corporations can choose to incorporate or set up their headquarters in
defendant-friendly states. 255 Foreign defendants can structure their business
dealings, like Daimler and McIntyre did, to avoid personal jurisdiction in the
United States entirely and force lawsuits to be filed in their home countries.
And business entities have nearly unfettered power to control forum
selection through contractual forum selection clauses. 256
248

See supra text accompanying notes 224–30.
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984) (“[A]ny potential unfairness in
applying New Hampshire’s statute of limitations to all aspects of this nationwide suit has nothing to do
with the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate the claims. . . . [W]e do not think that such choice-of-law
concerns should complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry.”); cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
254 (1958) (“The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law.”).
250 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779.
251 Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 525 (1989) (vindicating the convenience values of venue
transfer over the gamesmanship of law shopping).
252 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
253 See Amanda Bronstad, J&J Urges Halt to Hip Implant Trial in Dallas, TEX. LAW. (Aug. 17,
2017), https:|//www.law.com/texaslawyer/almID/1202795822397/JampJ-Urges-Halt-to-Hip-ImplantTrial-in-Dallas/?mcode=1395262493112&curindex=179 [https://perma.cc/7D54-S68G] (reporting this
kind of strategic consent).
254 Bradt & Rave, supra note 15, at 1289; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370–73 (1995) (identifying the threat of reverse
auctions); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (2008) (same).
255 See Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 127 (Del. 2016) (“Businesses select their states
of incorporation and principal places of business with care, because they know that those jurisdictions are
in fact ‘home’ and places where they can be sued generally.”).
256 See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 (2013). For discussions of
that power, see generally Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference,
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A related potential downside is horizontal forum selling, in which
federal judges or districts offer attractive results or procedures to incentivize
plaintiff-side selection of their forum. 257 The patent docket of the Eastern
District of Texas is one example; until recently, patent infringement
plaintiffs routinely chose to file there to take advantage of procedures
perceived as friendly to patent plaintiffs, and the relaxed patent venue rules
allowed such selection. 258 But the Supreme Court put an end to that practice
last term in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, when it
more narrowly construed the patent venue statute. 259 There is little evidence
that forum selling is a widespread problem, especially in light of normal
venue constraints. 260 As mentioned above, a number of federal statutes
authorize nationwide service of process, yet forum selling has not been
observed under them. 261
Further, forum selling is a two-way street. The reduction of plaintiffside forum selling through restrictive personal jurisdiction rules expands
opportunities for defendant-side forum selling. 262 Because restrictive
personal jurisdiction is likely to draw lawsuits against companies to states
where those companies choose to incorporate or set up their headquarters,
states could offer their courts and laws as particularly defendant-friendly in
an effort to attract safe havens for businesses likely to be named as
defendants in civil lawsuits. 263 Indeed, because states need not empower their
courts with the full reach of adjudicatory authority that the Constitution
allows, 264 nothing prevents a state from limiting the scope of its general

66 HASTINGS L.J. 675 (2015) (discussing party control in forum selection); Scott Dodson, Party
Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (proposing limits on party control
of forum selection).
257 See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 242–43 (2016).
258 See id. at 247–70. See generally Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical
Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing
the patent docket of the Eastern District).
259 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516–17 (2017).
260 See Klerman, supra note 216, at 717–18, 724.
261 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 257, at 306 (conceding that although nationwide service
statutes “make[] forum selling possible, . . . it does not seem to have materialized”).
262 See id. at 304 (acknowledging that restrictive forum doctrines “could lead to an equally harmful
pro-defendant bias”).
263 Consider, by way of analogy, the competition for Amazon’s HQ2 and the deals hopeful cities
have offered. See Kaya Yurieff, Cities are Doing Wacky Things to Host Amazon’s Second Headquarters,
CNN (Oct. 4, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/04/technology/amazon-second-headquarters-cityproposals/index.html [https://perma.cc/843X-X4CY].
264 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (finding general
jurisdiction appropriate under the Constitution but remanding to the Ohio Supreme Court because
“whether the courts of that State will choose to take jurisdiction over the corporation is reserved for the
courts of that State”).
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jurisdiction over its residents, further insulating them from litigation and
generating a race to the bottom among states seeking to attract businesses
through promises of limited personal jurisdiction. 265
A final objection is that aggregation is already too liberal, and
expanding personal jurisdiction will enable more opportunities for
aggregation. Even were that true, the appropriate way to address excessive
aggregation is on aggregation’s own terms, not through a doctrine having
little to do with aggregation. The aggregation rules and statutes are up to the
challenge of balancing the virtues and vices of aggregation on their own;
there is no need to complicate matters through the convoluted morass of
personal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
A new restrictive turn in personal jurisdiction threatens the salutary
benefits of aggregation in federal civil litigation. The Supreme Court’s recent
decisions narrowing both specific and general jurisdiction hinder the joinder
of claims, parties, and cases in ways that reduce the fairness and efficiency
of litigation. The solution is for Congress or the rulemakers to authorize
expanded personal jurisdiction for aggregation cases in federal court. Such
an effort would be constitutional and consistent with the spirit of the federal
rules of joinder.

265 Cf. 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c) (2006) (providing for narrower specific jurisdiction than
that allowed by the Constitution); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 129 (Del. 2016) (holding
Delaware’s corporation-registration statute not to confer general jurisdiction by consent).
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